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Abstract—Phishing as one of the most well-known cybercrime
activities is a deception of online users to steal their personal or
confidential information by impersonating a legitimate website.
Several machine learning-based strategies have been proposed
to detect phishing websites. These techniques are dependent
on the features extracted from the website samples. However,
few studies have actually considered efficient feature selection
for detecting phishing attacks. In this work, we investigate an
agreement on the definitive features which should be used in
phishing detection. We apply Fuzzy Rough Set (FRS) theory as
a tool to select most effective features from three benchmarked
data sets. The selected features are fed into three often used
classifiers for phishing detection. To evaluate the FRS feature
selection in developing a generalizable phishing detection, the
classifiers are trained by a separate out-of-sample data set of
14,000 website samples. The maximum F-measure gained by FRS
feature selection is 95% using Random Forest classification. Also,
there are 9 universal features selected by FRS over all the three
data sets. The F-measure value using this universal feature set is
approximately 93% which is a comparable result in contrast to
the FRS performance. Since the universal feature set contains no
features from third-part services, this finding implies that with
no inquiry from external sources, we can gain a faster phishing
detection which is also robust toward zero-day attacks.
Index Terms—Phishing Detection, Fuzzy Rough Set, Feature
Selection
I. INTRODUCTION
Phishing is categorized as a social engineering attack to
coheres users to perform adverse actions on behalf of an
attacker [1]. A usual purpose of such attacks is to deceive users
to steal their personal or confidential information. To this end,
phishers try to mimic the emails or web pages that indicate a
high visual similarity to the legitimate emails or web pages.
The pages are further accompanied with at least one login
form to gather personal or confidential user information [2].
The content of phishing emails and web pages are developed
from social engineering practices so that victims are persuaded
to follow the instructions with the hope of, for example,
updating or validating their information, finding a job, winning
a big prize, or receiving a significant discount to a service.
According to the most up-to-date trend reports by the Anti-
Phishing Working Group [3], over 151,014 unique phishing
websites and 270,557 unique emails have been documented.
These sites and emails mimicked at least 777 brands targeted
by phishing campaigns during the third quarter of 2018.
A range of technical strategies have been proposed to detect
phishing emails and websites. The strategies can broadly be
categorized into three classes: (i) list-based; (ii) heuristic;
and (iii) and machine learning (ML)-based approaches [4].
The first class simply references different lists of legitimate
and phishing URLs. While these lists are frequently updated,
there is an inevitable time gap between the emergence of
a phishing website, its observation, reporting, and finally,
addition to a suspicious URL list. This makes list-based
strategies vulnerable towards emerging and zero-day phishing
attacks [5]. Heuristic approaches can automatically recognize
a phishing web pages based a suite of features extracted
from them [6]. One method, for example, focuses on the
similarity of the suspicious web page with the legitimate one
based on visual features such as image, logo, and textual
content of the page [7]. However, there is no guarantee that a
phishing site and a legitimate web page or email has features
in common, which can cause poor detection accuracy in
practice. Furthermore, heuristic techniques can be bypassed by
a knowledgeable attacker that ensures their phishing website
does not contain the detected features. ML methods [8] are
also dependent on the set of features extracted for each web
page and further require ground truth phishing and legitimate
websites for training. The quality and variety of websites in
this training set has a strong effect on the final detection
accuracy [9], and it can be expensive to obtain a training set
that is suitably sized and diverse.
Despite these challenges, ML approaches for phishing de-
tection have been an active area of research. Several studies
have been conducted on different data sets using various
classification algorithms [10]–[12]. There is an undeniable
effect of the features used for classification on the accuracy
of an algorithm [13], but few studies have actually considered
intelligent methods feature selection. The problem of feature
selection is crucial to build phishing detection systems that are
generalizable in practice. For example, it is feasible that the set
of features best distinguishing phishing websites that imitate
a financial institution may be different from sites imitating
an e-commerce platform, or of websites that are encoded in
different languages. The present art in feature selection are
simply based on heuristic thresholds [13], [14].
To address this problem, we apply Fuzzy Rough Set (FRS)
theory [15] as a tool to select the most effective features for
detecting phishing websites in this paper. Our feature selection
scheme preprocesses features that are fed into three often
used classification methods for phishing detection: a multilayer
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perceptron, a random forest, and SMO. We train each classifier
on a separate out-of-sample dataset to examine the ability of
FRS feature selection in developing a generalizable phishing
detection. This training set which is composed by random
extraction of websites from an online repository [16] contains
7,000 legitimate and 7,000 phishing website samples. The ben-
efit of using FRS for feature selection is realized by comparing
our results against three recently proposed algorithms [13],
[14].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
discusses the related work on phishing detection. Section III
presents the procedure used for feature selection. Section IV
evaluates the proposed method and compares its performance
with other related algorithms. Finally, Section V summarizes
the main conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
ML-based approaches to detect phishing websites is an
active research area that employs a wide range of supervised
classification techniques to segregate phishing class. Feng et
al. propose a novel neural network for phishing detection [10].
They improve the generalization ability of the network by
designing risk minimization principle. Performance of the pro-
posed network is evaluated over a UCI repository 1 containing
11,055 samples labeled as phishing/legitimate. The dataset
also specifies 30 features for each website categorized as
Address bar-based, Abnormal-based, HTML/Javascript-based,
and Domain-based features. Rao and Pais propose a novel
algorithm to detect phishing websites using both machine
learning techniques and image checking. They also extract fea-
tures from URL, website content, and third-party services [9].
It is worth mentioning that although using the features from
third-party service can increase the detection time, it increases
the detection accuracy in practice [12]. They evaluate the
performance of the proposed algorithm over 1407 legitimate
and 2119 phishing websites collected from PhishTank 2 and
Alexa database 3, respectively.
Mohammad et al. propose a novel self-structuring neural
network for detecting phishing websites [4]. They specify
17 features, some extracted from third-party service, for 600
legitimate and 800 phishing websites collected from PhishTank
and Millersmiles 4 archives. Their experiments indicate the
high generalizability and ability of the neural network in
phishing detection. In another work, they propose a feed
forward neural network trained by back propagation to classify
websites [11]. 18 features are specified for 859 legitimate and
969 phishing websites, respectively. Jain and Gupta propose
a machine learning-based technique using only client-side
features to detect phishing websites [17]. They extract 19
features from the URL and source code of the web pages and
evaluate their method over 2,141 phishing web pages from
1https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/phishing+websites
2http://www.phishtank.com/
3http://www.alexa.com/
4http://www.millersmiles.co.uk/
PhishTank and Openfish 5 and 1,918 legitimate pages from
Alexa database, some online payment, and banking websites.
Although all the above-mentioned studies have suggested
different features to detect phishing websites, some features
may not be sufficiently discerning to highlight phishing in-
stances [13]. Only a limited number of work has focused
on selecting the most effective features to detect phishing
websites. Rajab proposes using Correlation Feature Set (CFS)
and Information Gain (IG) to select the most influential
features to detect phishing activities [13]. The results over
the UCI repository containing 30 features specified for 11,055
samples indicate 11 and 9 features selected by IG and CFS,
respectively. The classification performance using selected
features is also evaluated by a data mining method called
RIPPER. Similarly, Babagoli et al.use a similar data set and
propose feature selection using decision trees and the wrapper
method [18] which results in selecting 20 features [14]. They
evaluate the phishing detection performance using a novel
meta-heuristic-based nonlinear regression algorithm. Still, the
feature selection methods proposed by these studies are de-
pendent on the data and requires user-specified threshold
values which should be set heuristically. These thresholds can
affect the ultimate performance of the classification algorithm,
especially when features are selected based on out-of-sample
training data in practice.
In this work, we propose using FRS theory as the feature
selection algorithm. In contrast to the related work focusing on
only one data set, our experiments evaluate the generalizability
of our approach by finding a universal set of discriminative
features from three benchmark data sets. The datasets include
a new source of 7,000 legitimate and 7,000 phishing website
samples randomly extracted from the a phishing website
repository [16]. We compare the detection performance using
the selected features with the results of features selections
proposed in [13] [14].
III. FUZZY ROUGH SET FEATURE SELECTION
Rough Set (RS) theory, developed by Pawlak [15], is a
method to decide how to separate a set of data, with a decision
boundary and an indiscernibility relation R. Supposing each
set member si described by D features with discrete values,
R defines a binary similarity between two members sm and
sn as follows:
R(sm, sn) =
{
1 if ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., D} sm(i) = sn(i)
0 if ∃ i ∈ {1, ..., D} where sm(i) 6= sn(i)
Similar samples join individually together in one exclusive
class, [si]R, which is defined as follows:
[si]R = {sj | R(si, sj) = 1}
To better understand the definition of [si]R, figure 1 illustrates
a universe of discourse as a grid of equivalence class (squares)
representing set members that have identical feature values
(R = 1). The closed curved line further defines a hypothetical
5https://openphish.com/
Fig. 1: The universe of discourse regions segregated by RS
decision boundary. The dotted squares show regions that are
fully located within the decision boundary. Such regions are
equivalence classes are fully describable by the boundary
and are called the boundarys lower approximation set LAR.
The boundary region also contains the sets of equivalence
classes (white squares) that are both inside and outside of
the decision boundary. This boundary region unioned with
LAR forms the boundarys upper approximation set UAR.
Finally, the dark squares lying outside of the decision boundary
specify the samples that are rejected by the decision boundary.
Supposing f is the function defining the decision boundary
and U indicating the universe of discourse, UAR and LAR
are declared as:
LAR = {[si] ∈ U | ∀sj ∈ [si]R : f(sj) ≤ 0}
UAR = {[si] ∈ U | ∃sj ∈ [si]R : f(sj) ≤ 0}
For features with continuous values, RS is extended by Fuzzy
Rough Set (FRS) [19] theory. FRS asserts that there is a subset
of features representing the labels of a set member while
the remaining features are non-label. Assuming the feature
values are normalized between 0 and 1, the similarity relation
between two set members R is given by:
∀i ∈ F,L : R(sm, sn) = τ({max(0, 1−∆2(sm(i), sn(i)))})
where F and L are the sets of non-label and label features,
sm(i) shows the value of ith feature of sample sm, and
∆2(x, y) defines the squared difference between x and y. τ
is the Lukasiewicz t-norm [20] that aggregates the similarity
of all the features of the two samples and returns a values
in [0, 1]. The equation below indicates how to calculate the τ
where x and y are both in [0, 1]:
τ(x, y) = max(0, x+ y − 1)
To determine if a set member sm is in the upper or lower
approximation set of a decision boundary, FRS defines Upper
and Lower Approximation Memberships µU and µL as:
µU (sm) = sup
sn∈U,sn 6=sm
τ(RF (sm, sn), RL(sm, sn))
µL(sm) = inf
sn∈U,sn 6=sm
I(RF (sm, sn), RL(sm, sn))
TABLE I: Data set description
Dataset Year Size Num. Features Num. Phishing Sites
UCI1 2014 11,055 30 3,793
Mendeley 2018 10,000 48 5,000
UCI2 2014 1,353 9 702
TABLE II: Feature classes across the three data sets
Feature Class Description
Address bar-based
Features of the web page URL such as its
length in character, port, and the protocol used
to transfer information.
Abnormal-based
Features of abnormal activities on a page, such
as loading embedded objects from external do-
mains or submissions to an email address.
HTML/Javascript-based Features of HTML and Javascript functions em-bedded in the source code of the page.
Domain-based Features related to information from third-party
services.
where RF (sm, sn) shows the similarity between sm and sn
using only non-label features while RL(sm, sn) gives the sim-
ilarity using only label features set. I is the fuzzy Implicator
operator that is declared as follows where again q, s ∈ [0, 1]:
I(q, s) = min(1, 1− q + s)
A higher value of µL(sm) gives us more confidence that sm is
fully describable by the decision boundary. The values greater
than zero for this membership function are considered for
feature selection used in this work.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We apply FRS to select features from three benchmark data
sets for phishing attacks. Table I indicates the description of
data used in this work. The first data set is from the UCI
repository, UCI16, that contains 30 features over 11,055 sam-
ples labeled as phishing/legitimate websites. Based on [4], the
proposed features of this data set are categorized into 4 groups:
Address bar-based, Abnormal-based, HTML/Javascript-based,
and Domain-based features. Table II presents a description
of these classes in more detail. The second data set, Mende-
ley [21], specifies 48 features for 5,000 legitimate and 5,000
phishing websites. According to the feature class descrip-
tions in Table II, these 48 features can be also categorized
into three groups of Address bar-based, Abnormal-based, and
HTML/Javascript-based features. Also, Table III represents 23
features of this data set which are shared with the features in
UCI1. The UCI2 dataset7 specifies 9 features from across the
four feature classes over 702 phishing, 548 legitimate, and 103
suspicious websites. Suspicious website has features of both
legitimate and phishing samples and thus, can be considered
as either phishy or legitimate [22].
The differences in sample size and number of features
among the three data sets indicate some differences in the
characteristics of the data studied in this work. In UCI1,
6https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/phishing+websites
7https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Website+Phishing
the number of legitimate websites is more than twice of the
number of phishing samples while in Mendeley, these classes
have equal population size. In UCI2, although the sample
sizes of both classes are approximately similar and have the
dominant population, there is a minority class for suspicious
samples. Furthermore, in contrast to the UCI repositories
published in 2014, the Mendeley data has been published
recently and thus, can be a representative of more updated
samples for phishing websites. Finally, in contrast to some
related work focusing on small number of data [4], [9], [11],
[23], the sample size of data sets we consider is notably high.
To evaluate the detection performance using features se-
lected by FRS, we employ three well-known classification
algorithms: the multilayer-perceptron, random forest, and se-
quential minimal optimization (SMO) that have been ex-
tensively employed for phishing detection by other related
studies [9], [12], [13], [17]. All hyper-parameters are also set
based on the values used in these previous works. To evaluate
the ability for FRS feature selection to develop a generalizable
phishing detector, we train each classifier on a separate out-
of-sample dataset composed by random extraction of phishing
and non-phishing websites from an online repository [16]. This
training set has 7,000 legitimate and 7,000 phishing website
samples.
We compare the results using FRS against three recently
proposed feature selection algorithms: information gain (IG),
correlated feature set [13] (CFS), and using a combination of
decision tree and the Wrapper method [14] (DW). IG chooses
features from a ranking based on the level of information
each provides with respect to the target class (features which
specifies the class labels) [13]. CFS sorts features based
on their correlation with the target class. The first-ranked
feature has highest correlation with the target class and lowest
correlation with the others [13]. DW utilizes a combination
of decision tree and Wrapper to select an optimal feature
set [14]. Since IG and CFS just provide a ranking of features,
a threshold is needed to specify which features should be
selected as efficient. Furthermore, DW is dependent on the
expert opinion to decide what decreasing in the accuracy
should be considered as significant to stop the method. In this
work, the thresholds and other settings are set based on the
values suggested in [13] and [14].
Figure 2 presents the F-measure values for classifiers using
four feature selection algorithms over each data set. Assuming
phishing and legitimate samples belong to positive and neg-
ative classes respectively, F-measure calculates the quality of
classification for both classes [24]. This metric is defined as
2 × Precision×RecallPrecision+Recall where Precision = TPTP+FP indicates
number of truly detected phishing samples over number of all
samples identified as phishing. Also, Recall = TPTP+FN is the
number of truly identified phishing samples over the number
of all existed phishing websites.
Across all datasets, the random forest model yields the
best performance no matter the feature selection method
considered. Over UCI1 and Mendeley, the FRS performance
is higher than the other feature selection algorithms. The
TABLE III: Features shared between UCI1 and Mendeley
No. Feature Name Type Description
1 UrlLen D length of URLs.
2 ExtFavicon B Favicon is from a different do-
main.
3 NumDash D No. dash in webpage URL.
4 NumDashInHostname D No. dash in URL host name.
5 AtSymbol B @ exists in the URL.
6 NoHttps B HTTP exists in the URL.
7 IpAddress B URL host name contains IP.
8 DomainInPaths B URL path contains
TLD/ccTLD.
9 UrlLenRT C No. all characters in the web-page URL.
10 PctExtResUrls C % external resource URLs in
the HTML source code.
11 PctExtHlinks C % external links in the HTML
source code.
12 ExtFormAct B An external domain URL in
the form action attribute.
13 AbnormFormAct C
Occurring abnormal strings
(#, about:blank, empty string,
javascript:true) in form action.
14 PctNullSelfRedirHlinks C
% hyperlink fields of cur-
rent URL, empty, abnormal, or
self-redirect values.
15 Submit2Email B HTML source code contains
mailto.
16 PctExtResUrlsRT C % external resource URLs inwebpage HTML source code.
17 AbnormExtFormActR C
Occurring empty string, for-
eign domain, about:blank in
form action.
18 ExtMetaScriptLinkRT C % meta, script and link tagscontaining external URLs.
19 PctExtNullSelfRedirHlinksRT C
% hyperlinks in HTML source
code with different domain
names.
20 RightClickDisabled B
HTML source code contains
command to disable right
click.
21 PopUpWin B HTML source code containspop-ups.
22 FakeLinkInStatusBar B HTML source code contains
onMouseOver.
23 IframeOrFrame B HTML source code contains
frame/iframe.
The column Type indicates the value types of features. D, B, and C
show discrete, binary, and categorical values, respectively.
identical performance of FRS and IG over UCI2 is also the
result of both methods selecting all features, which could be a
byproduct of the small size of this dataset. The small number
of features on UCI2 also contribute to the comparatively low
performance of all classifiers on this dataset. In contrast to
IG, CFS, and DW which are dependent on some thresholds
set heuristically, FRS discovers the data dependencies for
feature selection based on the data with no need for additional
information. In other words, FRS enables handling incomplete
information to select effective features based on fuzzy set
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Fig. 2: F-measure for different classifiers and features sets
theory that investigates vagueness in rough set framework [25].
We further investigate the types of features selected by
each method. Table IV presents the list of features selected
by FRS for each data set. 24, 30, and 9 features have been
selected for UCI1, Mendeley, and UCI2, respectively. As
indicated, 7 features selected for UCI1 are Domain-based
which utilize third-party services such as Alexa or WHOIS
databases to get more information about phishing samples.
However, Mendeley does not use any Domain-based feature
and as Figure 2 indicates, the maximum performance over
Mendeley is approximately 95% which outperforms all the
FRS results over UCI1. It shows using domain-based features
not only increases the detection time due to inquiry from
external sources [12], but also has no significant effect to
improve the detection performance.
The bold features in Table IV are shared features among
all three data sets that have been selected by FRS. FRS
identifies the four Address Bar-based features UrlLen, Pref-
Suff, HaveSubDomain, and Favicon, accompanied with the
five Abnormal-based features of ReqUrl, UrlAnchor, LinksIn-
Tags, SFH, and Submit2Email to be “universally applicable”
features for phishing detection across all datasets. As phishers
often use long URLs, UrlLen is a discrete feature to consider
the length of web page URL. Dash in URLs is also another
signal for phishing websites which is considered by PrefSuff
that checks the existence of prefixes or suffixes separated by
dash in the URL. HaveSubDomain examines another way of
confusing the website visitors which modifies the number of
subdomains in the URL address. Favicon also checks if the
favicon indicated in the address bar is loaded from another
domain. ReqUrl is an Abnormal-based feature which considers
if the external objects within the webpage are loaded from
another domain. UrlAnchor checks whether an anchor within
the web page has different domain or has no link to other
pages. Legitimate websites often use meta, script, and link
tags in their HTML document. LinksInTags examines the
percentage of such tags in the web page source code. The
value of Server Form Handler (SFH) can be another way to
distinguish phishing pages. The empty string or “about:blank”
in the SFH can indicate legitimate website while different
domain name in SFH shows a phishing effort. Finally, using a
client-side function called “mailto:” to submit user information
to an external server can indicate a phishing attack. This
examines by the Boolean feature called Submit2Email.
As mentioned above, the universal features are based on
the general signals in the address bar or the HTML document
of the web page regardless of its application (e-commerce,
online banking, etc), its dominant language, or its statistical
reports in external sources like Alexa. The fifth bar for each
data set in Figure 2 indicates the performance using only
these universal features. Although on UCI2, the low number
of features belonging to the universal feature set (only 4)
reduces the detection performance, the maximum performance
of universal features (≈ 93%) competes with the maximum
FRS performance (≈ 95%) over UCI1 and Mendeley. It
indicates that although the universal feature set has lower
number of features, its F-measure value is comparable with
the result of the larger set of features selected by FRS. Since
no domain-based feature belongs to the universal feature set,
this finding can not only reduce the detection time and make
it robust towards zero-day attacks, it can solve the curse of
dimensionality for classification techniques [26] [27].
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we consider finding an agreement about the
definitive features which should be used in detecting phishing
websites. We evaluate the detection performance using features
selected by Fuzzy Rough Set (FRS) theory based on three
benchmarked phishing data sets. After selecting the features,
we utilize three well-known classification techniques and con-
duct the experiments by an unseen data set of 14,000 website
samples to avoid classification overfitting. Comparisons with
TABLE IV: Features selected by FRS over the data sets
UCI1 Mendeley UCI2
Feature Class Feature Class Feature Class
IPAddress 1 NumDots 1 IPAddress 1
UrlLen 1 SubDomainLevl 1 UrlLen 1
ShortService 1 PathLevl 1 SSLfinalSt 1
AtSymbol 1 UrlLen 1 ReqUrl 2
PrefSuff 1 NumDash 1 UrlAnchor 2
HaveSubDomain 1 NumUnderscore 1 SFH 2
SSLfinalSt 1 NumQueryComp 1 PopUpWin 3
DomainRegLen 1 NumNumcChars 1 WebTraffic 4
Favicon 1 RandString 1 AgeOfDomain 4
HTTPSToken 1 DomainInPaths 1
ReqUrl 2 HostnameLen 1
UrlAnchor 2 PathLen 1
LinksInTags 2 DoubleSlashInPath 1
SFH 2 ExtFavicon 1
Submit2Email 2 PctExtResUrls 2
Redirect 3 PctExtHlinks 2
PopUpWin 3 InsecureForms 2
AgeOfDomain 4 RelativeFormAction 2
DNSRecord 4 PctNullSelfRedirHlinks 2
WebTraffic 4 Submit2Email 2
PageRank 4 FreqDomainNameMismatch 3
GoogleIndx 4 IframeOrFrame 3
LinksToPage 4 MissingTitle 3
StatisticalReport 4 PctExtResUrlsRT 3
AbnormExtFormActR 3
ExtMetaScriptLinkRT 3
PctExtNullSelfRedirHlinksRT 3
Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4 indicate Address bar-based, Abnormal-
based, HTML/Javascript-based, and Domain-based feature classes,
respectively.
other feature selection methods utilized by the related work
indicate the outperformance of FRS in selecting efficient fea-
tures. The maximum F-measure gained by the features selected
by FRS is 95% using Random Forest classification. Also, there
are 9 universal features selected by FRS over all the three data
sets. The F-measure value using this universal feature set is
approximately 93% which is a comparable result in contrast
to the FRS performance. Since the universal features contain
no domain-based features, this finding implies that with no
inquiry from external sources, we can gain a faster phishing
detection which is also robust toward zero-day attacks.
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